




















A Quantum Logic of Down Below
P. D. Bruza and D. Widdows and John Woods
1 Introduction
The logic that was purpose-built to accommodate the hoped-for reduction of
arithmetic gave to language a dominant and pivotal place. Flowing from the
founding efforts of Frege, Peirce, andWhitehead and Russell, this was a logic
that incorporated proof theory into syntax, and in so doing made of gram-
mar a senior partner in the logicistic enterprise. The seniority was reinforced
by soundness and completeness metatheorems, and, in time, Quine would
quip that the “grammar [of logic] is linguistics on purpose” [Quine, 1970,
p. 15] and that “logic chases truth up the tree of grammar” [Quine, 1970,
p. 35]. Nor was the centrality of syntax lost with the Go¨del incompleteness
results, which, except for the arithmeticization of syntax, would have been
impossible to achieve.
Logic’s preoccupation with language is no recent thing. In Aristotle’s
logic of the syllogism, the target properties of necessitation and syllogistic
entailment are properties of sentences or sets of sentences of Greek. Only
with the likes of Peirce and Frege is the rejection of natural language explicit,
each calling for a logic whose properties would attach to elements of artificial
languages, and — after Tarski — to such elements in semantic relation to
non-linguistic set theoretic structures.
It is hardly surprising that mathematical logic should have given such
emphasis to language, given that the motivating project of logic was to fa-
cilitate the reduction of arithmetic to an obviously analytic discipline. Still,
it is also worthy of note that the historic role of logic was to lay bare the
logical structure of human reasoning. Aristotle is clear on this point. The
logic of syllogisms would serve as the theoretical core of a wholly general
theory of real-life, two-party argumentation. Even here, the centrality of
language could not be ignored. For one thing, it was obvious that real-life
argumentation is transacted in speech. For a second, it was widely held
(and still is) that reasoning is just soliloquial argumentation (just as argu-
mentation is held to be reasoning in public — out loud, so to speak). Given
these purported equivalences, reasoning too was thought of as linguistic.
2It is convenient to date the birth of modern mathematical logic from the
appearance in 1879 of Frege’s great book on the language of logic, Begriffss-
chrift. It is easy to think of logic as having a relatively unfettered and richly
progressive course ever since, one in which even brutal setbacks could be
celebrated as triumphs of metalogic. There is, however, much of interven-
ing importance from 1904 onwards, what with developments in intuitionist,
modal, many-valued and relevant logics, which in retrospect may seem to
presage crucial developments in the second half of that century. Suffice it
here to mention Hintikka’s seminal work on epistemic logic [Hintikka, 1962],
which is notable in two important respects. One is the introduction of agents
as load-bearing objects of the logic. The other is the influence that agents
are allowed to have on what the theory is prepared to count as its logical
truths. The logical truths of this system include its indefensible sentences,
where these in turn include sentences which it would be self-defeating for
an agent to utter (e.g., “I can’t speak a single word of English”). It is
easy to see that Hintikka here allows for a sentence to be a truth of logic
if its negation is pragmatically inconsistent. To this extent, the presence of
agents in his logic occasions the pragmaticization of its semantics.
Agents now enter logic with a certain brisk frequency. They are either
expressly there or are looming forces in theories of belief dynamics and sit-
uation semantics, in theories of default and non-monotonic reasoning, and
in the incipient stirrings of logics of practical reasoning. Notable as these
developments are, they all lie comfortably within the embrace of the lin-
guistic presumption. Agents may come or go in logic, but whether here or
there, they are, in all that makes them of interest to logicians, manipulators
of language. What is more, notwithstanding the presence of agents, these
were logics that took an interest in human reasoning rather than human
reasoners. This made for a fateful asymmetry in which what human rea-
soners are like (or should be) is read off from what human reasoning is like
(or should be).
It may be said, of course, that this is exactly the wrong way around, that
what reasoning is (or should be) can only be read off from what reasoners are
(and can be). Such a view one finds, for example in [Gabbay and Woods, 2001]
and [Gabbay and Woods, 2003b], among logicians, and, also in the social
scientific literature [Simon, 1957, Stanovich, 1999, Gigerenzer and Selten, 2001b].
Here the leading idea of the “new logic” is twofold. First, that logic’s origi-
nal mission as a theory of human reasoning should be re-affirmed. Second,
that a theory of human reasoning must take empirical account of what hu-
man reasoners are like – what they are interested in and what they are
capable of.
It is easy to see that the human agent is a cognitive being, that human
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beings have a drive to know. They desire to know what to believe and
what to do. And since, whatever else it is, reasoning is an aid to cogni-
tion, a theory of human reasoning must take into account how beings like
us operate as cognitive systems. Here, too, the empirical record is indis-
pensable. It is the first point of contact between logic and cognition. In
this way symbolic inference becomes “married” to computations through
state (dimensional) spaces motivated from cognition which may open the
door the large-scale operational symbolic inference systems. The logicians
Barwise and Seligman have advocated such a marriage between logic and
cognition [Barwise and Seligman, 1997, p.234]. This bears in an important
way on what we have been calling the linguistic presumption. For if the
empirical record is anything to go on, much of the human cognitive project
is sublinguistic, and inaccessible to introspection. This, the cognition of
“down below”, carries consequences for the new logic. If logic is to attend
to the cognizing agent, it must take the cognizer as he comes, warts and all.
Accordingly, a theory of human reasoning must subsume a logic of down
below.
These days, the logic of down below appears to have a certain memetic
status. It is an idea whose time has come. In addition to the work of Gab-
bay and Woods, the idea is independently in play in a number of recent
writings. In [Churchland, 1989, Churchland, 1995] we find a connection-
ist approach to subconscious abductive processes (cf. [Burton, 1999]). In a
series of papers, Horgan and Tiensen develop a rules without representa-
tion (RWR) framework for cognitive modeling [Horgan and Tienson, 1988,
Horgan and Tienson, 1989, Horgan and Tienson, 1990, Horgan and Tienson, 1992,
Horgan and Tienson, 1996, Horgan and Tienson, 1999b, Horgan and Tienson, 1999a]
(Cf. [Guarini, 2001]). Other non-representational orientations include [Wheeler, 2001,
Sterelny, 1990, Brooks, 1991, Globus, 1992, Shannon, 1993, Thelen and Smith, 1993,
Wheeler, 1994, Webb, 1994, Beer, 1995] (Cf. [Wimsatt, 1986] and [Clark, 1997]).
A neural symbolic learning systemic framework is developed in [d’Avila Garcez et al., 2002,
d’Avila Garcez and Lamb, 2004] and extended to abductive environments
in [Gabbay and Woods, 2005, ch. 6]. Bruza and his colleagues advance a se-
mantic space framework [Bruza et al., 2004, Bruza and Cole, 2005b, Bruza et al., 2006].
The present chapter is offered as a contribution to the logic of down
below. In the section to follow, we attempt to demonstrate that the nature
of human agency necessitates that there actually be such a logic. The
ensuing sections develop the suggestion that cognition down below has a
structure strikingly similar to the physical structure of quantum states. In
its general form, this is not an idea that originates with the present authors.
It is known that there exist mathematical models from the cognitive science
of cognition down below that have certain formal similarities to quantum
4mechanics. We want to take this idea seriously. We will propose that
the subspaces of von Neumann-Birkhoff lattices are too crisp for modelling
requisite cognitive aspects in relation to subsymbolic logic. Instead, we
adopt an approach which relies on projections into nonorthogonal density
states. The projection operator is motivated from cues which probe human
memory.
2 Agency
In this section our task is to orient the logic of down below by giving an
overview of salient features of individual cognitive agency. Investigations
of non-monotonic reasoning (NMR) have successfully provided an impres-
sive symbolic account of human practical reasoning over the last two and
half decades. The symbolic characterization of practical reasoning, however,
is only part of the picture. Ga¨rdenfors [Ga¨rdenfors, 2000, p. 127] argues
that one must go under the symbolic level of cognition. In this vein, he
states, “. . . information about an object may be of two kinds: propositional
and conceptual. When the new information is propositional, one learns
new facts about the object, for example, that x is a penguin. When the
new information is conceptual, one categorizes the object in a new way, for
example, x is seen as a penguin instead of as just a bird”. Ga¨rdenfors’ men-
tion of “conceptual” refers to the conceptual level of a three level model of
cognition [Ga¨rdenfors, 2000]. How information is represented varies greatly
across the different levels. The sub-conceptual level is the lowest level within
which information is carried by a connectionist representation. Within the
uppermost level information is represented symbolically. It is the interme-
diate, conceptual level, or conceptual space, which is of particular relevance
to this account. Here properties and concepts have a geometric represen-
tation in a dimensional space. For example, the property of “redness” is
represented as a convex region in a tri-dimensional space determined by the
dimensions hue, chromaticity and brightness. The point left dangling for the
moment is that representation at the conceptual level is rich in associations,
both explicit and implicit. We speculate that the dynamics of associations
are primordial stimuli for practical inferences drawn at the symbolic level of
cognition. For example, it seems that associations and analogies generated
within conceptual space play an important role in hypothesis generation.
Ga¨rdenfors ([Ga¨rdenfors, 2000], p48) alludes to this point when he states,
“most of scientific theorizing takes place within the conceptual level.”
Ga¨rdenfors’ conjecture receives strong endorsement from an account of
practical reasoning developed in [Gabbay and Woods, 2003a, Gabbay and Woods, 2005],
in which reasoning on the ground is understood to function under economic
constraints. In this essay, our own point of departure is that subsymbolic
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reasoning is valuable to human agents precisely for the economies it achieves.
It will help to place this assumption in its proper context by giving a brief
overview of our approach to cognitive agency.
A Hierarchy of Agency Types
It is useful to repeat the point that since reasoning is an aid to cognition, a
logic, when conceived of as a theory of reasoning, must take this cognitive
orientation deeply into account. Accordingly, we will say that a cognitive
system is a triple of a cognitive agent, cognitive resources, and cognitive
target performed in real time. (See here [Norman, 1993, Hutchins, 1995].)
Correspondingly, a logic of a cognitive system is a principled description of
conditions under which agents deploy resources in order to perform cognitive
tasks. Such is a practical logic when the agent it describes is a practical
agent.
A practical logic is but an instance of a more general conception of logic.
The more general notion is reasoning that is target-motivated and resource-
dependent. Correspondingly, a logic that deals with such reasoning is a
Resource-Target Logic (RT-logic). In our use of the term, a practical logic
is a RT-logic relativized to practical agents.
How agents perform is constrained in three crucial ways: in what they
are disposed towards doing or have it in mind to do (i.e., their agendas); in
what they are capable of doing (i.e., their competence); and in the means
they have for converting competence into performance (i.e., their resources).
Loosely speaking, agendas here are programmes of action, exemplified by
belief-revision and belief-update, decision-making and various kinds of case-
making and criticism transacted by argument. 1
Agency-type is set by two complementary factors. One is the degree of
command of resources an agent needs to advance or close his (or its) agendas.
For cognitive agendas, three types of resources are especially important.
They are (1) information, (2) time, and (3) computational capacity. The
other factor is the height of the cognitive bar that the agent has set for
himself. Seen this way, agency-types form a hierarchyH partially ordered by
the relation C of commanding-greater-resources-in-support-of-higher-goals-
than. H is a poset (a partially ordered set) fixed by the ordered pair 〈C,X〉
of the relation C on the unordered set of agents X .
Human agency divides roughly into the individual and the institutional.
By comparison, individual agency ranks low in H . For large classes of cases,
individuals perform their cognitive tasks on the basis of less information and
less time than they might otherwise like to have, and under limitations on
the processing and manipulating of complexity. Even so, paucity must not
1Agendas are discussed at greater length in [Gabbay and Woods, 2002].
6be confused with scarcity. There are lots of cases in which an individual’s
resources are adequate for the attainment of the attendant goal. In a rough
and ready way, we can say that the comparative modesty of an agent’s
cognitive goals inoculates him against cognitive-resource scarcity. But there
are exceptions, of course.
Institutional entities contrast with human agents in all these respects. A
research group usually has more information to work with than any individ-
ual, and more time at its disposal; and if the team has access to the appro-
priate computer networks, more fire-power than most individuals even with
good PCs. The same is true, only more so, for agents placed higher in the
hierarchy — for corporate actors such as NASA, and collective endeavours
such as particle physics since 1970. Similarly, the cognitive agendas that
are typical of institutional agents are by and large stricter than the run-of-
the-mill goals that motivate individual agents. In most things, NASA aims
at stable levels of scientific confirmation, but, for individuals the defeasibly
plausible often suffices for local circumstances.
These are vital differences. Agencies of higher rank can afford to give
maximization more of a shot. They can wait long enough to make a try for
total information, and they can run the calculations that close their agendas
both powerfully and precisely. Individual agents stand conspicuously apart.
He must do his business with the information at hand, and, much of the
time, sooner rather than later. Making do in a timely way with what he
knows now is not just the only chance of achieving whatever degree of
cognitive success is open to him as regards the agenda at hand; it may also
be what is needed in order to avert unwelcome disutilities, or even death.
Given the comparative humbleness of his place in H , the human individual
is frequently faced with the need to practise cognitive economies. This is
certainly so when either the loftiness of his goal or the supply of drawable
resources create a cognitive strain. In such cases, he must turn scantness to
advantage. That is, he must (1) deal with his resource-limits and in so doing
(2) must do his best not to kill himself. There is a tension in this dyad. The
paucities with which the individual is chronically faced are often the natural
enemy of getting things right, of producing accurate and justified answers
to the questions posed by his agenda. And yet, not only do human beings
contrive to get most of what they do right enough not to be killed by it, they
also in varying degrees prosper and flourish. This being so, we postulate for
the individual agent slight-resource adjustment strategies (SRAS), which he
uses to advantage in dealing with the cognitive limitations that inhere in
the paucities presently in view. We make this assumption in the spirit of
Simon [1957] and an ensuing literature in psychology and economics. At the
heart of this approach is the well-evidenced fact that, for ranges of cases,
2. AGENCY 7
“fast and frugal” is almost as good as full optimization, and at much lower
cost [Gigerenzer and Selten, 2001a]. We shall not take time here to detail
the various conditions under which individuals extract outcome economies
from resource limitations and target modesty, but the examples to follow
will give some idea of how these strategies work.
Although resource-paucity should not be equated with resource-scarcity,
it remains the case that in some sense practical agents operate at a cog-
nitive disadvantage. It is advisable not to make too much of this. What
should be emphasized is that in relation to the cognitive standards that
an institutional agent might be expected to meet, the resources available
to a practical agent will typically not enable him (or it) to achieve that
standard. Whether this constitutes an unqualified disadvantage depends on
the nature of the task the individual has set for himself and the cognitive
resources available to him. For a practical agent to suffer an unqualified
disadvantage, two factors must intersect in the appropriate way: his re-
sources must be inadequate for the standard he should hit, in relation to a
goal that has reasonably been set for him. So, the measure of an agent’s
cognitive achievement is a function of three factors: his cognitive goal; the
standard required (or sufficient) for achieving that goal; and the cognitive
wherewithal on which he can draw to meet that standard.
In discharging his cognitive agendas, the practical agent tends to set
goals that he can attain and to be stocked with the wherewithal that makes
attainment possible (and frequent). In the matter of both goals set and
the execution of standards for meeting them, the individual is a satisficer
rather than an optimizer. There are exceptions, of course; a working math-
ematician won’t have a solution of Fermat’s Last Theorem unless he has a
full-coverage proof that is sound (and, as it happens, extremely long).
The tendency to satisfice rather than maximize (or optimize) is not what
is distinctive of practical agency. This is a point to emphasize. In most of
what they set out to do and end up achieving, institutional agents exhibit
this same favoritism. What matters — and sets them apart from the likes
of us — is not that they routinely optimize but that they satisfice against
loftier goals and tougher standards.
Slight-resource Adjustment Strategies
Slight-resource adjustment strategies lie at the crux of the economy of effort,
as Rescher calls it [Rescher, 1996, p.10]. They instantiate a principle of
least effort, and they bear on our tendency to minimize the expenditure of
cognitive assets.2We note here some examples.
Examples are easy to come by in discussing cognitive and economic be-
2See here the classic work of George Zipf. [Zipf, 1949]
8haviour. More formal examples are also easy to come by, in every field of
study. Statistical studies such as opinion polls always give results to within
a given level of confidence (e.g., “these predictions are valid to within ±3%
with 95% confidence”), and part of the science of statistics lies in making
reliable statements of this nature given the size of sample taken. Medical
tests are often only correct to a known precision, and given the fequency of
false-positives, the result of a positive test-result is often a further round of
more reliable but more invasive tests.
It may be tempting to presume that such knowledge-constrained strate-
gies are mainly confined to empirical or practical sciences, but this is far
from the case. For example, mathematics is full of rules-of-thumb and fa-
mous theorems that reduce difficult problems to easy ones. These begin for
many early students with the familiar division rules, such as “if a number
ends in a 2 or a 5, it is divisible by 2 or 5”, or the more complex “if the
alternating sum of the digits of a number is divisible by 11, the number
itself is divisible by 11”. Such results do not produce the quotient of the
division, but they may tell the student whether such a computation is worth
the trouble if the goal is to end up with a whole number. More advanced
division properties are embodied in results such as Fermat’s Little Theo-
rem, which states that if p is prime and 1 ≤ a ≤ p, then ap−1 ∼= 1 (mod p).
Like many important theorems, this only gives necessary but not sufficient
conditions for a statement (in this case, the statement “p is prime”) to be
true. However, if this necessary condition holds for enough values of a, we
may conclude that p is probably prime, which is in fact a strong enough
guarantee for some efficient encryption algorithms. Even in mathematics,
often regarded as the most exact and uncompromising discipline, short-cuts
that are close enough are not only important, they are actively sought after.
2.1 Hasty Generalization
Individual cognitive agents are hasty generalizers, otherwise known as thin-
slicers. Hasty generalization is a SRAS. In standard approaches to fallacy
theory and theories of statistical inference, hasty generalization is a blooper;
it is a serious sampling error. This is the correct assessment if the agent’s
objective is to find a sample that is guaranteed to raise the conditional
probability of the generalization, and to do so in ways that comport with
the theorems of the applied mathematics of chance. Such is an admirable
goal for agents who have the time and know-how to construct or find samples
that underwrite such guarantees. But as J.S. Mill shrewdly observed, human
individuals often lack the wherewithal for constructing these inferences. The
business of sample-to-generalization induction often exceeds the resources
of individuals and is better left to institutions. (See [Woods, 2004].) A
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related issue, even supposing that the requisitely high inductive standards
are meetable in a given situation in which a practical agent finds himself, is
whether it is necessary or desirable for him (or it) to meet that standard.
Again, it depends on what the associated cognitive goal is. If, for example,
an individual’s goal is to have a reasonable belief about the leggedness of
ocelots is, rather than to achieve the highest available degree of scientific
certainty about it, it would suffice for him to visit the ocelot at the local
zoo, and generalize hastily ”Well, I see that ocelots are four-legged”.
2.2 Generic Inference
Often part of what is involved in a human reasoner’s facility with the one-
off generalization is his tendency to eschew generalizations in the form of
universally quantified conditional propositions. When he generalizes hastily
the individual agent is often making a generic inference. In contrast to
universally quantified conditional propositions, a generic claim is a claim
about what is characteristically the case. “For all x, if x is a ocelot, then
x is four-legged” is one thing; “Ocelots are four-legged” is quite another
thing [Krifka et al., 1995]. The first is felled by any true negative instance,
and thus is brittle. The second can withstand multiples of true negative
instances, and thus is elastic. There are significant economies in this. A
true generic claim can have up to lots of true negative instances. So it is
true that ocelots are four-legged, even though there are up to lots of ocelots
that aren’t four-legged. The economy of the set-up is evident: With generic
claims, it is unnecessary to pay for every exception. One can be wrong in
particular without being wrong in general.
Generic claims are a more affordable form of generalization than the
universally quantified conditional. This is part of what explains their dom-
inance in the generalizations that individual agents tend actually to make
(and to get right, or some near thing). It must not be thought, however,
that what constitutes the rightness (or some near thing) of an individual’s
hasty generalizations is that when he generalizes thus he generalizes to a
generic claim. Although part of the story, the greater part of the rightness
of those hasty generalizations arises from the fact that, in making them,
an individual typically has neither set himself, nor met, the standard of in-
ductive strength. This, together with our earlier remarks about validity, is
telling. Given the cognitive goals typically set by practical agents, validity
and inductive strength are typically not appropriate (or possible) standards
for their attainment. This, rather than computational costs, is the deep rea-
son that practical agents do not in the main execute systems of deductive
or inductive logic as classically conceived.
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2.3 Natural Kinds
Our adeptness with generic inference and hasty generalization is connected
to our ability to recognize natural kinds [Krifka et al., 1995, pp.63–95]. Nat-
ural kinds have been the object of much metaphysical skepticism of late
[Quine, 1969], but it is a distinction that appeals to various empirical the-
orists. The basic idea is evident in concepts such as frame [Minsky, 1975],
prototype [Smith and Medin, 1981], script [Schank and Abelson, 1977] and
exemplar [Rosch, 1978]. It is possible, of course, that such are not a matter
of metaphysical unity but rather of perceptual and conceptual organization.
It goes without saying that even when the goal is comparatively modest
— say, what might plausibly be believed about something at hand — not
every hasty generalization that could be made comes anywhere close to
hitting even that target. The (defeasible) rule of thumb is this: The hasty
generalizations that succeed with these more modest goals are by and large
those we actually draw in actual cognitive practice. We conjecture that the
comparative success of such generalizations is that they generalize to generic
propositions, in which the process is facilitated by the agent’s adeptness in
recognizing natural kinds. In section 5, we discuss the extent to which a
quantum logical framework provides a more useful model for adapting to
natural kinds than either Boolean set theory or taxonomy.
2.4 Consciousness
A further important respect in which individual agency stands apart from
institutional agency is that human agents are conscious. (The consciousness
of institutions, such as it may be figuratively speaking, supervenes on the
consciousness of the individual agents who constitute them.) Consciousness
is both a resource and a limitation. Consciousness has a narrow bandwidth.
This makes most of the information that is active in a human system at a
time consciously unprocessible at that time. In what the mediaevals called
the sensorium (the collective of the five senses operating concurrently), there
exist something in excess of 10 million bits of information per second; but
fewer than 40 bits filter into consciousness at those times. Linguistic agency
involves even greater informational entropy. Conversation has a bandwidth
of about 16 bits per second.3
3[Zimmermann, 1989]. Here is John Gray on the same point: “If we do not act in the
way we think we do, the reason is partly to do with the bandwidth of consciousness —
its ability to transmit information measured in terms of bits per second. This is much
too narrow to be able to register the information we routinely receive and act on. As
organisms active in the world, we process perhaps 14 million bits of information per
second. The bandwidth of consciousness is around eighteen bits. This means that we
have conscious access to about a millionth of the information we daily use to survive”
[Gray, 2002, p. 66].
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The narrow bandwidth of consciousness bears on the need for cognitive
economy. It helps elucidate what the scarcity of information consists in.
We see it explained that at any given time the human agent has only slight
information by the fact that if it is consciously held information there is
a bandwidth constraint which regulates its quantity. There are also de-
vices that regulate consciously processible information as to type. A case
in point is informational relevance. When H.P. Grice issued the injunction,
“Be relevant”, he left it undiscussed whether such an imperative could in
fact be honoured or ignored by a conscious act of will. There is evidence
that the answer to this question is “No”; that, in lot’s of cases, the mech-
anisms that steer us relevantly in the transaction of our cognitive tasks,
especially those that enable us to discount or evade irrelevance, are auto-
matic and pre-linguistic [Gabbay and Woods, 2003a]. If there is marginal
capacity in us to heed Grice’s maxim by consciously sorting out relevant
from irrelevant information, it is likely that these informational relevancies
are less conducive to the closing of cognitive agendas than the relevancies
that operate “down below”. Thus vitally relevant information often can’t
be processed consciously, and much of what can is not especially vital.4
Consciousness can claim the distinction of being one of the toughest prob-
lems, and correspondingly, one of the most contentious issues in the cog-
nitive sciences. Since the agency-approach to logic subsumes psychological
factors, it is an issue to which the present authors fall heir, like it or not.
Many researchers accept the idea that information carries negative entropy,
that it tends to impose order on chaos.5 If true, this makes consciousness a
thermodynamically expensive state to be in, since consciousness is a radical
suppressor of information. Against this are critics who abjure so latitudi-
narian a conception of information [Hamlyn, 1990] and who remind us that
talk about entropy is most assured scientifically for closed systems (and that
ordinary individual agents are hardly that).
The grudge against promiscuous “informationalism”, in which even physics
goes digital [Wolfram, 1984], is that it fails to explain the distinction be-
tween energy-to-energy transductions and energy-to-information transfor-
mations [Tallis, 1999, p. 94]. Also targeted for criticism is the view that
4Consider here taxonomies of vision in which implicit perception has a well-established
place [Rensink, 2000].
5Thus Colin Cherry: “In a descriptive sense, entropy is often referred to as a ‘measure
of disorder’ and the Second Law of Thermodynamics as stating that ‘systems can only
proceed to a state of increased disorder; as time passes, entropy can never decrease.’ The
properties of a gas can change only in such a way that our knowledge of the positions and
energies of the particles lessens; randomness always increases. In a similar descriptive
way, information is contrasted, as bringing order out of chaos. Information, then is said
to be ‘like’ negative energy” [Cherry, 1966, p. 215].
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consciousness arises from or inheres in neural processes. If so, “[h]ow does
the energy impinging on the nervous system become transformed into con-
sciousness?” [Tallis, 1999, p. 94].
In the interests of economy, we decline to join the metaphysical fray over
consciousness. The remarks we have made about consciousness are intended
not as advancing the metaphysical project but rather as helping character-
ize the economic limitations under which individual cognitive agents are
required to perform.
Consciousness is tied to a family of cognitively significant issues. This is
reflected in the less than perfect concurrence among the following pairs of
contrasts:
1. conscious v unconscious processing
2. controlled v automatic processing
3. attentive v inattentive processing
4. voluntary v involuntary processing
5. linguistic v nonlinguistic processing
6. semantic v nonsemantic processing
7. surface v depth processing
What is striking about this septet of contrasts is not that they admit of
large intersections on each side, but rather that their concurrence is ap-
proximate at best. For one thing, “tasks are never wholly automatic or
attentive, and are always accomplished by mixtures of automatic and at-
tentive processes” [Shiffrin, 1997, p. 50]. For another, “depth of processing
does not provide a promising vehicle for distinguishing consciousness from
unconsciousness (just as depth of processing should not be used as a cri-
terial attribute for distinguishing automatic processes . . . ” [Shiffrin, 1997,
p. 58]). Indeed “[s]ometimes parallel processing produces an advantage for
automatic processing, but not always . . . . Thoughts high in consciousness
often seem serial, probably because they are associated with language, but
at other times consciousness seems parallel . . .” [Shiffrin, 1997, p. 62].
It is characteristic of agents of all types to adjust their cognitive tar-
gets upwards as the cognitive resources for attaining them are acquired. A
practical agent may take on commitments previously reserved for agents
of higher rank if, for example, he is given the time afforded by a tenured
position in a university, the information stored in the university’s library
and in his own PC, and the fire-power of his university’s mainframe. In
like fashion, institutional agents constantly seek to expand their cognitive
resources (while driving down the costs of their acquisition, storage and de-
ployment), so that even more demanding targets might realistically be set.
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Accordingly, agents tend toward the enhancement of cognitive assets when
this makes possible the realization of cognitive goals previously unattain-
able (or unaffordable). Asset enhancement is always tied to rising levels
of cognitive ambition. In relation to cognitive tasks adequately performed
with present resources, an interest in asset enhancement is obsessive beyond
the range of what would count as natural and proportionate improvements
upon what is already adequately dealt with.
2.5 Subsymbolic reasoning
Practical reasoning is reasoning performed by practical agents, and is there-
fore subject to economic constraints. In this connection, we advance the
following conjecture: It may well be that because such associations are
formed below the symbolic level of cognition, significant cognitive economy
results. This is not only interesting from a cognitive point of view, but also
opens the door to providing a computationally tractable practical reasoning
systems, for example, operational abduction to drive scientific discovery in
biomedical literature [Bruza et al., 2004, Bruza et al., 2006]
The appeal of Ga¨rdenfors’ cognitive model is that it allows inference to
be considered not only at the symbolic level, but also at the conceptual (ge-
ometric) level. Inference at the symbolic level is typically a linear, deductive
process. Within a conceptual space, inference takes on a decidedly associ-
ational character because associations are often based on similarity (e.g.,
semantic or analogical similarity), and notions of similarity are naturally
expressed within a dimensional space. For example, Ga¨rdenfors states that
a more natural interpretation of “defaults” is to view them as “relations be-
tween concepts”.6 This is a view which flows into the account which follows:
the strength of associations between concepts change dynamically under the
influence of context. This, in turn, influences the defaults haboured within
the symbolic level of cognition.
It is important to note the paucity of representation at the symbolic level
and reflect how symbolic reasoning systems are hamstrung as a result. In
this connection, Ga¨rdenfors ([Ga¨rdenfors, 2000, p. 127]) states, “ ..informa-
tion about categorization can be quite naturally transfered to propositional
information: categorizing x as an emu, for example, can be expressed by
the proposition “x is an emu”. This transformation into the propositional
form, however, tends to suppress the internal structure of concepts. Once
one formalizes categorizations of objects by predicates in a first-order lan-
guage, there is a strong tendency to view the predicates as primitive, atomic
notions and to forget that there are rich relations among concepts that dis-
6In the theory of Gabbay and Woods, default reasoning is a core slight-resource com-
pensation strategy.
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appear when put into standard logical formalism.”
The above contrast between the conceptual and symbolic levels raises the
question as to what are the implications for providing an account of practical
reasoning. Ga¨rdenfors states that concepts generate “expectations that re-
sult in different forms of non-monotonic reasoning”, which are summarized
as follows:
Change from a general category to a subordinate
When shifting from a basic category, e.g., “bird” to a subordinate category,
e.g., “penguin”, certain default associations are given up (e.g., “Tweety
flies”), and new default properties may arise (e.g., “Tweety lives in Antarc-
tica”).
Context effects
The context of a concept triggers different associations that “lead to non-
monotonic inferences”. For example, Reagan has default associations “Rea-
gan is a president”, “Reagan is a republican” etc., but Reagan seen in the
context of Iran triggers associations of “Reagan” with “arms scandal”, etc.
The effect of contrast classes
Properties can be relative, for example, “a tall Chihuahua is not a tall dog”
([Ga¨rdenfors, 2000, p. 119]),. In the first contrast class “tall” is applied
to Chihuahuas and the second instance it is applied to dogs in general.
Contrast classes generate conceptual subspaces, for example, skin colours
form a subspace of the space generated by colours in general. Embedding
into a subspace produces non-monotonic effects. For example, from the fact
that x is a white wine and also an object, one cannot conclude that x is a
white object (as it is yellow).
Concept combination
Combining concepts results in non-monotonic effects. For example,metaphors
([Ga¨rdenfors, 2000, p. 130]), Knowing that something is a lion usually leads
to inferences of the form that it is alive, that it has fur, and so forth. In the
combination, stone lion, however, the only aspect of the object that is lion-
like is its shape. One cannot conclude that a stone lion has the other usual
properties of a lion, and thus we see the non-monotonicity of the combined
concept.
An example of the non-monotonic effects of concept combination not
involving metaphor is the following: A guppy is not a typical pet, nor is
guppy is a typical fish, but a guppy is a typical pet fish.
In short, concept combination leads to conceptual change. These corre-
spond to revisions of the concept and parallel belief revisions modelled at
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the symbolic level, the latter having received thorough examination in the
artificial intelligence literature.
The preceding characterization of the dynamics of concepts and associ-
ated non-monotonic effects is intended to leave the impression that a lot
of what happens in connection with practical reasoning takes place within
a conceptual (geometric) space, or a space of down-below. What is more,
this impression may provide a foothold towards realizing genuine opera-
tional systems. This would require that at least three issues be addressed.
The first is that a computational variant of the conceptual level of cogni-
tion is necessary. Secondly, the non-monotonic effects surrounding concepts
would need to be formalized and implemented. Thirdly, the connection be-
tween these effects and NMR at the symbolic level needs to be specified.
This account will cover aspects related to the first two of these questions.
Computational approximations of conceptual space will be furnished by se-
mantic space models which are emerging from the fields of cognition and
computational linguistics. Semantic space models not only provide a cog-
nitively motivated basis to underpin human practical reasoning, but from
a mathematical perspective, they show a marked similarity with quantum
mechanics (QM) [Aerts and Czachor, 2004]. This introduces the tantaliz-
ing and unavoidably speculative prospect of formalizing aspects of human
practical reasoning via QM.
3 Semantic space: computational approximations of
conceptual space
To illustrate how the gap between cognitive knowledge representation and
actual computational representations may be bridged, the Hyperspace Ana-
logue to Language (HAL) semantic space model is employed [Lund and Burgess, 1996,
Burgess et al., 1998]. HAL produces representations of words in a high di-
mensional space that seem to correlate with the equivalent human represen-
tations. For example, “...simulations using HAL accounted for a variety of
semantic and associative word priming effects that can be found in the lit-
erature...and shed light on the nature of the word relations found in human
word-association norm data”[Lund and Burgess, 1996]. Given an n-word
vocabulary, HAL computes an n× n matrix constructed by moving a win-
dow of length l over the corpus by one word increment ignoring punctuation,
sentence and paragraph boundaries. All words within the window are con-
sidered as co-occurring with the last word in the window with a strength
inversely proportional to the distance between the words. Each row i in the
matrix represents accumulated weighted associations of word i with respect
to other words which preceded i in a context window. Conversely, column
i represents accumulated weighted associations with words that appeared
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def calculate hal(documents, n)
HAL = 2DArray.new()
for d in documents {
for i in 1 .. d.len {





Figure 1.1. Algorithm to compute the HAL matrix for a collection of doc-
uments. It is assumed that the documents have been pruned of stop words
and punctuation.
after i in a window. For example, consider the text “President Reagan ig-
norant of the arms scandal”, with l = 5, the resulting HAL matrix H would
be:
arms ig of pres reag scand the
arms 0 3 4 1 2 0 5
ig 0 0 0 4 5 0 0
of 0 5 0 3 4 0 0
pres 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
reag 0 0 0 5 0 0 0
scand 5 2 3 0 1 0 4
the 0 4 5 2 3 0 0
Table 1.1. A simple semantic space computed by HAL
If word precedence information is considered unimportant the matrix
S = H+HT denotes a symmetric matrix in which S[i, j] reflects the strength
of association of word i seen in the context of word j, irrespective of whether
word i appeared before or after word j in the context window. The column
vector Sj represents the strengths of association between j and other words
seen in the context of the sliding window: the higher the weight of a word,
the more it has lexically co-occurred with j in the same context(s). For
example, table 1.2 illustrates the vector representation for “Reagan” taken
from a matrix S computed from a corpus of 21578 Reuters7 news feeds
7The Reuters-21578 collection is standard test collection used for research into auto-
matic text classification
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president (5259), administration (2859), trade (1451), house (1426), bud-
get (1023), congress (991), bill (889), tax (795), veto (786), white (779),
japan (767), senate (726), iran (687), billion (666), dlrs (615), japanese
(597), officials (554), arms (547), tariffs (536) . . .
Table 1.2. Example representation of the word “Reagan”
taken from the year 1988. (The weights in the table are not normalized).
Highly weighted associations reflect Reagan in his presidential role deal-
ing with congress, tax, vetoes etc. In addition, the more highly weighted
association reflect a default-like character, e.g., “president” and “adminis-
tration”. Associations with lower weights seem to reflect the trade war with
Japan (“japan”, “tariffs”) and the Iran-contra scandal (“Iran”, “arms”). In
other words, the representation of Reagan represents a mixture of different
“senses” of Reagan. This facet is intuitively similar to the QM phenomenon
of a particle being in a state of superposition.
HAL is an exemplar of a growing ensemble of computational models
emerging from cognitive science, which are generally referred to as se-
mantic spaces [Lund and Burgess, 1996, Burgess et al., 1998, Lowe, 2000,
Lowe, 2001, Landauer and Dumais, 1997, Landauer et al., 1998, Patel et al., 1997,
Schu¨tze, 1998, Levy and Bullinaria, 1999, Sahlgren, 2002]. Even though
there is ongoing debate about specific details of the respective models, they
all feature a remarkable level of compatibility with a variety of human infor-
mation processing tasks such as word association. Semantic spaces provide
a geometric, rather than propositional, representation of knowledge. They
can be considered to be approximations of conceptual space proposed by
Ga¨rdenfors [Ga¨rdenfors, 2000], and of reasoning down below as proposed
by [Gabbay and Woods, 2003a, Gabbay and Woods, 2005].
Within a conceptual space, knowledge has a dimensional structure. For
example, the property colour can be represented in terms of three dimen-
sions: hue, chromaticity, and brightness. Ga¨rdenfors argues that a property
is represented as a convex region in a geometric space. In terms of the
example, the property “red” is a convex region within the tri-dimensional
space made up of hue, chromaticity and brightness. The property “blue”
would occupy a different region of this space. A domain is a set of inte-
gral dimensions in the sense that a value in one dimension(s) determines or
affects the value in another dimension(s). For example, the three dimen-
sions defining the colour space are integral since the brightness of a colour
will affect both its saturation (chromaticity) and hue. Ga¨rdenfors extends
the notion of properties into concepts, which are based on domains. The
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concept “apple” may have domains taste, shape, colour, etc. Context is
modelled as a weighting function on the domains, for example, when eating
an apple, the taste domain will be prominent, but when playing with it,
the shape domain will be heavily weighted (i.e., it’s roundness). One of the
goals of this article is to provide both a formal and operational account of
this weighting function.
Observe the distinction between representations at the symbolic and con-
ceptual levels. At the symbolic level “apple” can be represented as the
atomic proposition apple(x). However, within a conceptual space (con-
ceptual level), it has a representation involving multiple inter-related di-
mensions and domains. Colloquially speaking, the token “apple” (symbolic
level) is the tip of an iceberg with a rich underlying representation at the
conceptual level. Ga¨rdenfors points out that the symbolic and conceptual
representations of information are not in conflict with each other, but are
to be seen as “different perspectives on how information is described”.
Barwise and Seligman [Barwise and Seligman, 1997] also propose a geo-
metric foundation to their account of inferential information content via the
use of real-valued state spaces. In a state space, the colour “red” would be
represented as a point in a tri-dimensional real-valued space. For example,
brightness can be modelled as a real-value between white (0) and black (1).
Integral dimensions are modelled by so called observation functions defining
how the value(s) in dimension(s) determine the value in another dimension.
Observe that this is a similar proposal, albeit more primitive, to that of
Ga¨rdenfors as the representations correspond to points rather than regions
in the space.
Semantic space models are also an approximation of Barwise and Selig-
man state spaces whereby the dimensions of the space correspond to words.
A word j is a point in the space. This point represents the “state” in the
context of the associated text collection from which the semantic space was
computed. If the collection changes, the state of the word may also change.
Semantic space models, however, do not make provision for integral dimen-
sions. An important intuition for the following is the state of a word in
semantic space is tied very much with its “meaning”, and this meaning
is context-sensitive. Further, context-sensitivity will be realized by state
changes of a word.
In short, HAL, and more generally semantic spaces, are a promising, prag-
matic means for knowledge representation based on text. They are compu-
tational approximations, albeit rather primitively, of Ga¨rdenfors’ conceptual
space. Moreover, due to their cognitive track record, semantic spaces would
seem to be a fitting foundation for considering realizing computational vari-
ants of human reasoning. Finally, it has been shown that a semantic space
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is formally a density matrix, a notion from QM [Aerts and Czachor, 2004,
Bruza and Cole, 2005a]. This opens the door to exploring further connec-
tions with QM.
4 Bridging Semantic Space and Quantum Mechanics
HAL exemplifies how a semantic space model assigns each word in a given
vocabulary a point in a finite dimensional vector space. Lowe [Lowe, 2001]
formalizes semantic space models as a quadruple 〈A,B, F,M〉 where
• B is a set of m basis elements
• A is a function which maps the co-occurrence frequencies between
words in a vocabulary V and the basis elements so each w ∈ V is
represented by a vector (A(b1, w), . . . , A(bm, w))
• F is a function which maps pairs of vectors onto continuous valued
quantity. The interpretation of F is often “semantic similarity” be-
tween the two vectors in question.
• M is a transformation which takes one semantic space and maps it
into another, for example via dimensional reduction
A semantic space8 S is an instance of the range of the function A. That
is, S is a m× n matrix where the columns {1, . . . , n} correspond to vector
representations of words.A typical method for deriving the vocabulary V
is to tokenize the corpus from which the semantic space is computed and
remove non information bearing words such as “the”, “a”, etc. The letters
u, v, w will be used to identify individual words.
The interpretation of the basis elements corresponding to the rows {1 . . .m}
depends of the type of semantic space in question. For example, table 3 il-
lustrates that HAL produces a square matrix in which the rows are also
interpreted as representations of terms from the vocabulary V . In contrast,
a row in the semantic space models produced by Latent Semantic Analy-
sis [Landauer et al., 1998] corresponds to a text item, for example, a whole
document, a paragraph, or even a fixed window of text, as above. The
value S[t, w] = x denotes the salience x of word w in text t. Information-
theoretic approaches are sometimes use to compute salience. Alternatively,
the (normalized) frequency of word w in context t can be used.
For reasons of a more straightforward embedding of semantic space into
QM, we will focus on square, symmetric semantic spaces (m = n). The
following draws from [van Rijsbergen, 2004]
8Bear in mind that the term “space” should not be interpreted as a “vector space”.
This unfortunate blurring between “matrix” and “space” in the technical sense occurs
because “semantic space” is a term from the cognitive science literature.
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The notation on the LHS is called a ket, and originates from quantum
physicist Paul Dirac. Conversely, a row vector v = (v1, . . . , vn) is denoted
by the bra 〈v|.









Addition of vectors |u〉 + |v〉 is also as one would expect. In Dirac nota-
tion, the scalar product of two n-dimensional real9 valued vectors u and v





The outer product |u〉〈u| produces a n × n symmetric matrix. Vectors
u and v are orthogonal iff 〈u|v〉 = 0. Scalar product allows the length of a
vector to be defined: ‖u‖ =
√
〈u|u〉. A vector |u〉 can be normalized to unit
length (‖u‖ = 1) by dividing each of its components by the vector’s length:
1
‖u‖ |u〉.
A Hilbert space is a complete10 inner product space. In the formalization
to be presented in ensuing sections, a semantic space S is an n-dimensional
real-valued Hilbert space using Euclidean scalar product as the inner prod-
uct.
A Hilbert space allows the state of a quantum system to be represented. It
is important to note that a Hilbert space is an abstract state space meaning
QM does not prescribe the state space of specific systems such as electrons.
This is the responsibility of a physical theory such as quantum electrody-
namics. Accordingly, it is the responsibility of semantic space theory to
offer the specifics: In a nutshell, a ket |w〉 describes the state of “meaning”
9QM is founded on complex vector spaces. We restrict our attention to finite vector
spaces of real numbers.
10The notion of a “complete” vector space should not be confused with “completeness”
in logic. The definition of a completeness in a vector space is rather technical, the details
of which are not relevant to this account.
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of a word w. It is akin to a particle in QM. The state of a word changes due
to context effects in a process somewhat akin to quantum collapse. This in
turn bears on practical inferences drawn due to context effects of word seen
together with other words as described above.
In QM, the state can represent a superposition of potentialities. By way
of illustration consider the state σ of a quantum bit, or qubit as:
(1.4) |σ〉 = α|0〉+ β|1〉
where α2 + β2 = 1. The vectors |0〉 and |1〉 represent the characteristic
states, or eigenstates, of “off” and “on”. Eigenstates are sometimes referred
to as pure, or basis states. They can be pictured as defining orthogonal axes












The state σ is a linear combination of eigenstates. Hard though it is to
conceptualize, the linear combination allows the state of the qubit to be a
mixture of the eigenstates of being “off” and “on” at the same time.
In summary, a quantum state encodes the probabilities of its measurable
properties, or eigenstates. The probability of observing the qubit being off
(i.e., |0〉 is α2). Similarly, β2 is the probability of observing it being “on”.
The above detour into QM raises questions in relation to semantic space.
What does it mean that a word is a superposition - a “mixture of poten-
tialities”? What are the eigenstates of a word?
4.1 Mixed and eigenstates of a word meaning
.
Consider the following traces of text from the Reuters-21578 collection:
• President Reagan was ignorant about much of the Iran arms scandal
• Reagan says U.S to offer missile treaty
• Reagan seeks more aid for Central America
• Kemp urges Reagan to oppose stock tax.
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Each of these is a window which HAL will process accumulating weighted
word associations in relation to the word “Reagan”. In other words, in-
cluded in the HAL vector for “Reagan” are associations dealing with the
Iran-contra scandal, missile treaty negotiations with the Soviets, stock tax
etc. The point is when HAL runs over the full collection, the vector rep-
resentation for “Reagan”is a mixture of eigenstates, whereby an eigenstate
corresponds to a particular “sense”, or “characteristic meaning” of the con-
cept “Reagan”. For example, Reagan, in the political sense, in the sense
dealing with the Iran-Contra scandal, etc. The senses of a concept are
equivalent of the eigenstates of a particle in QM [Bruza and Cole, 2005a,
Aerts et al., 2005, Widdows and Peters, 2003].
Consider once again the HAL matrix H computed from the text “Pres-
ident Reagan ignorant of the arms scandal”. As mentioned before, S =
H + HT is a real symmetric matrix. Consider a set of y text windows of
length l which are centred around a word w. Associated with each such
text window j, 1 ≤ j ≤ m, is a semantic space Sj . It is assumed that the
semantic space is n-dimensional, whereby the n dimensions correspond to a
fixed vocabulary V as above. The semantic space around word w, denoted





The above formula provides a toehold for computing a semantic space in
terms of a sum of semantic spaces; each constituent semantic space corre-
sponding to a specific sense of the concept w. By way of illustration, Let
the concept w be “Reagan” and assume there are a total of y traces centred
on the word “Reagan”, x of which deal with the Iran-contra issue. These
x traces can be used to construct a semantic space using equation 1.7. Let




the concept w has m senses. As each sense i represents a particular state
of w, each can be represented as a semantic space Si with an associated
probability.
(1.8) Sw = p1S1 + . . .+ pmSm
where p1 + . . .+ pm = 1.
This formula expresses that the semantic space around a concept w can
be conceived of as a linear combination of semantic spaces around senses
of w. The formula is intuitively close to an analogous formula from QM
whereby a density matrix can be expressed as a probability mixture of
density matrices [Barndorff-Nielsen et al., 2003, p. 778]. A density matrix
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represents the state of a quantum system. A density matrix ρ represents a
basis state if it has a single eigenvector (eigenstate)|e〉 whereby ρ = |e〉〈e|.
The vector e is termed a state vector and is assumed to be normalized to unit
length, i.e., 〈e|e〉 = 1. Otherwise a density matrix ρ represents a “mixed”
state (superposition). A density matrix corresponding to a mixed state can
be expressed as a weighted combination of density matrices corresponding to
basis states. There is no requirement that the state vectors of the pure states
are orthogonal to one another. This is a very important point. Intuitively,
it is unrealistic to require the senses of a concept to be orthogonal. For
this reason, the term “sense” will be used to denote the basis state of a
word meaning, rather than “eigenstate”, because, in QM, eigenstates are
assumed to be mutually orthogonal.
The connection between the notions of semantic space and density matrix
have been detailed elsewhere [Aerts and Czachor, 2004, Bruza and Cole, 2005a].
As mentioned in the introduction, there are various semantic space models
presented in the literature. Each will involve a different rendering as density
matrix. The method adopted in this account rests on the intuition the ket
|ei〉 in each semantic space Si of equation 1.8 corresponds to a state vector
representing a sense of concept w. A density matrix ρi can be formed by
the product |ei〉〈ei|. Building on this, a density matrix ρw corresponding to
the semantic space Sw can be constructed as follows.
(1.9) ρw = p1ρ1 + . . .+ pmρm
Importantly, no assumption of orthogonality has been made.
This approach to representing a semantic space in a state contrasts ap-
proaches using the spectral decomposition of the semantic space [Aerts and Czachor, 2004,
Aerts and Gabora, 2005]. As the semantic space Sw is a symmetric matrix,










= d1|e1〉〈e1|+ . . .+ dk|ek〉〈ek|
This equation parallels the one given in equation 1.9. The eigenvalues di
relate to the probabilities of the associated eigenvectors (eigenstates in QM
terminology). Each eigenstate |ei〉 contributes to the linear combination
via the density matrix |ei〉〈ei|. The eigenstates |ei〉 of Sw should ideally
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correspond to the senses of word w. Unfortunately, this does not bear out
in practice. A fundamental problem is that the eigenstates |ei〉 computed
by SVD are orthogonal, and in reality the senses of a word w need not be.
(See [Bruza and Cole, 2005a] for more details).
4.2 The collapse of meaning in the light of context
We continue by connecting the above development of quantum mechanics
in semantic space to Ga¨rdenfors’ views on the interaction of context and
the meaning of concepts. He states, “The starting point is that, for some
concepts, the meaning of the concept is determined by the context in which
it occurs” [Ga¨rdenfors, 2000, p.119]. Context effects manifest in relation to
contrast classes. In the introduction, the Chihuahua showed how property
tall is relative, “a tall Chihuahua is not a tall dog”. He also illustrates
how contrast classes manifest in word combinations. Consider, “red” in the
following combinations, “red book”, “red wine”, “red hair”, “red skin”, “red
soil”. Ga¨rdenfors argues contrast classes generate conceptual subspaces, for
example, skin colours form a subspace of the space generated by colours in
general. In other words, each of the combinations involving “red” results in a
separate subspace representing the particular quality of “red”, for example,
the quality of “red” would actually be “purple” when “red” is seen in the
context of “wine”.
The collapse of word meaning can be thought of in terms of the quantum
collapse of the particle but with an important difference: The collapse due
to context may not always result in a basis state because the context may
not be sufficient to fully resolve the sense in question. By way of illustration,
consider “Reagan” in the context of “Iran”. For the purposes of discussion,
assume there are two possible senses. The first deals with the Iran-contra
scandal, and the other deals with hostage crisis at the American embassy
in Teheran. The distinction between a measurement due to context and
a physical measurement possibly has its roots in human memory. Matrix
models of human memory also contain the notion of superimposed mem-
ory states, and it has been argued, “The superposition of memory traces
in a vector bundle resulting from a memory retrieval has often been con-
sidered to be a noisy signal that needs to be ‘cleaned up’ [i.e., full collapse
onto a basis state as in QM]. The point we make here is that this is not
necessarily so and that the superposition of vectors [after retrieval] is a pow-
erful process that adds to the flexibility of memory processes.” (Emphasis
ours) [Wiles et al., 1994].
This distinction requires a less stringent notion of collapse as maintained
within QM. Consider a concept w considered in the light of some context,
for example, other words. The context is denoted generically by X . The
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effect of context X is brought about by a projection operator Px. Assuming
the density matrix ρw corresponding to a concept w, the collapse of meaning
in the light of context X is characterized by the following equation:
(1.10) Pxρw = pρ
x
w
where p denotes the probability of collapse and ρxw is the state of w after
the “collapse” of its meaning.
In terms of QM, ρw is an “observable” meaning an observable physical
quantity. An observable is represented by a self-adjoint operator. As ρw
is a real symmetric matrix, it is therefore also a self-adjoint operator on
Hilbert space. (Recall that semantic space is a Hilbert space). This is con-
sistent with the second axiom of QM [Byron and Fuller, 1992]. Even though
this equation has the form of an eigenvalue problem, the value p is not an
eigenvalue. It is a theorem that the eigenstates of a self adjoint operator
belonging to different eigenvalues must be orthogonal, a requirement which
is too strong for word meanings as was motivated earlier. Nevertheless, it
will be be shown later that p derives from the geometry of the space as do
eigenvalues.
The previous equation is also consistent with the third axiom of QM as
the result of “measurements of the observable [ρw]” is an element of “the
spectrum of the operator”. In our case, the spectrum is specified by the
probability mixture given in equation 1.9, but more of the flexibility of this
equation is exploited than is the case in QM. The key to this flexibility
revolves around the fact that the sum of density matrices is a density ma-
trix. By way of illustration, equation 1.9 can be equivalently written as the
probability mixture:
ρw = p1ρ1 + p2ρ2
where p1+p2 = 1. Let ρ1 correspond to the state of “Reagan” in the context
of “Iran” and ρ2 the state of “Reagan” in all other contexts. Assume, that
“Reagan” is seen in the context of “Iran”. The projection operator Px
collapses ρw onto ρ1 with probability p1. Unlike, QM, the state ρ1 is not a
basis state but corresponds to a partially resolved sense. Let the Iran-contra
sense be denoted |c〉 and the Iranian embassy hostage crisis be denoted |h〉.
In the light of this example, the density matrix corresponding to the state
after collapse due to “Iran” would be of the form ρ1 = pc|c〉〈c| + ph|h〉〈h|,
where pc + ph = 1.
It has been argued in [Bruza and Cole, 2005a] that in terms of this run-
ning example many would assume the “Iran-contra” sense of “Reagan” when
“Reagan” is seen in the context of “Iran”. This phenomenon may have its
roots in cognitive economy. Full resolution requires processing, and to avoid
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this processing, humans “guess” the more likely sense (In the example, pc
happens to be substantially greater than ph). In other words, we cautiously
put forward the conjecture that collapse of meaning and abductive processes
go hand in hand to fully resolve the sense, i.e., collapse onto a basis state.
Even though “full” collapse eventually results, the process is not direct as
is the the case of the collapse in QM.11.
The running example reveals something of the nature of the projection
operator Px. If Px is orthogonal to a sense |ei〉 represented by the density
matrix ρi = |ei〉〈ei|, then Px projects this sense onto the zero vector |0〉.
(Note the corresponding density matrix is |0〉〈0|). If the projection Px is not
orthogonal to a sense |ei〉, then it has the effect of retrieving those senses
out of the combination expressed in equation 1.9. This is not unlike the
notion of a cue which probes human memory. Cues can be used to access
memory in two ways; via matching or retrieval processes. Matching entails
the “comparison of the test cue(s) with the information stored in mem-
ory” [Humphreys et al., 1989, p 41.]. This process measures the similarity
of the cue(s) and the memory representation. The output of this process
is a scalar quantity (i.e., a single numeric value representing the degree or
strength of the match). Memory tasks which utilise this access procedure
include recognition and familiarity tasks. Retrieval involves the “recovery
of qualitative information associated with a cue” [Humphreys et al., 1989, p
141.]. This information is modelled as a vector of feature weights. Retrieval
tasks include free recall, cued-recall, and indirect production tasks.
The intuition we will attempt to develop is that collapse of word meaning
due to context is akin to a cued-recall retrieval operation driven by the
projector Px on a given density matrix corresponding to the state of a word
meaning. The probability of collapse p is a function of the scalar quantity
resulting from matching.
In the matrix model of memory [Humphreys et al., 1989] , memory rep-
resentations can include items, contexts or, combinations of items and con-
texts (associations). Items can comprise stimuli, words, or concepts. Each
item is modelled as a vector of feature weights. Feature weights are used
to specify the degree to which certain features form part of an item. There
are two possible levels of vector representation for items. These include:
• modality specific peripheral representations (e.g., graphemic or phone-
mic representations of words)
• modality independent central representations (e.g., semantic represe-
11For a more detailed discussion of how the logic of abduction engages with the cogni-
tive economy of practical agency, see [Gabbay and Woods, 2005]. For the link between
abduction and semantic space, see [Bruza et al., 2006]
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natations of words)
In our case, our discussion will naturally focus on the latter due to assump-
tion that semantic spaces deliver semantic representations of words. For
example, the “Reagan” vector |r〉 from the semantic space Sr illustrates a
“modality independent central representation”.
Context can be conceptualised as a mental representation (overall holis-
tic picture) of the context in which items, or events have occurred. (e.g.,
“Reagan” in the context of “Iran”). Context is also modelled as a vector of
feature weights. Following from this, context is X is assumed to be repre-
sented by a ket |x〉. In the case of the running example, the “Iran” vector
|i〉 drawn from the semantic space Si could be employed as a context vector.
Memories are associative by nature and unique representations are cre-
ated by combining features of items and contexts. Several different types of
associations are possible [Humphreys et al., 1989]. The association of inter-
est here is a two way association between a word |w〉 and a context |x〉. In
the matrix model of memory, an association between context and a word is
represented by an outer product; |w〉〈x|. Seeing a given word (a target) in
the context of other words (cue) forms an association which probes memory.
Observe with respect to the running example how the probe |r〉〈i| embodies
both the cue of the probe “Iran” and the target “Reagan”.
In the light of the above brief digression into a matrix model of human
memory, one possibility is to formalize the projector Px as the probe |w〉〈x|.
The object being probed is a density matrix which is not a superposition
of memory traces but of semantic spaces hinged around a particular word
or concept. Equation 1.8 and its density matrix equivalent (equation 1.9)
reflect this superposition, however in this case the traces, in their raw form,
are windows of text.
In short, viewing the collapse of meaning in terms of retrieval and match-
ing processes in memory refines the collapse equation 1.10 as follows. Let
|w〉 be a target concept and |x〉 be the context. Firstly, collapse of mean-
ing is characterized by projecting the probe into the memory corresponding
to the state of the target word w. The collapse equates with retrieving a
new state of meaning reflecting the change of meaning of w in light of the
context.




The probability p of collapse is assumed to be a function12 of the match
between the probe and the memory:
12Further research is needed to provide the specifics of this function which will take
into account issues such as decay processes in memory
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(1.12) p = f(〈x|ρw|w〉)
Motivating the collapse of meaning by means of the matrix model of memory
introduces a deviation from orthodox QM. After application of the probe
|w〉〈x|, the the state after the collapse, denoted ρxw is not guaranteed to be
density matrix. This deviation from orthodox QM is not solely a techni-
cal issue. It may well be that there are different qualities of probe. For
example, “Reagan” in the context of “Iran” would intuitively involve a pro-
jection of the global “Reagan” semantic space onto a subspace dealing with
“Iran”. On the other hand, consider “lion” in the context of ”stone”. In
this case, the result after the application of the context would seem to be
considerably outside the “lion” space as a “stone lion” does not share many
of the attributes of a living one. It would seem, then, a projection operator
is not the appropriate mechanism, but rather a more general linear oper-
ator which can project “outside” the space. In the latter case, equating
Px with the probe |w〉〈x| is arguably justified as such probes in the ma-
trix model of memory briefly described earlier are transformations of the
space, rather than projections into it. An alternative view is that “stone
lion” is a result of concept combination and mechanisms other than pro-
jection operators are required to suitably formalize it. For example, Aerts
and Gabora [Aerts and Gabora, 2005] resort to tensor products for concept
combination. These are slippery issues requiring a clean distinction between
context effects and concept combination. More research is needed to clarify
these issues in relation to a logic of down below.
It remains to provide a characterization of Px as an orthodox projector
as typified by the “Reagan in the context of “Iran” example. In order to
do this, the senses B = {|e1〉, . . . , |em〉} are assumed to form a basis. (The
assumption here is linear independence, which is a weaker assumption than
assuming the |ei〉’s are mutually orthogonal, i.e., an orthonomal basis as is
commonly seen in orthodox QM). The set B represents the basis of the space
Sw in relation to ρw. Let Bx = {|x1〉, . . . , |xr〉} and By = {|y1〉, . . . , |ym−r〉}
such that Bx ∪By = B. The set Bx is the basis of the subspace Sx due to
context X . The complementary space is denoted Sy. By way of illustration
in terms of the running example, Bx = {|x1〉, |x2〉} would corresponds to the
two senses of “Reagan” in the context of “Iran” previously introduced as
|ec〉 and |eh〉. Though complementary spaces, Sx and Sy are not assumed to
be orthogonal. Consequently, the projection operator Px is “oblique” rather
than orthogonal. Once again, this is a deviation from orthodox QM, but
nevertheless faithful to the underlying intuition behind projection operators.
As stated earlier, the projection operator Px “retrieves” the relevant senses
out of the probability mixture (equation 1.9), that is Px|xi〉 = |xi〉, for
xi ∈ {|x1〉, . . . , |xr〉}. These are the so called fixed points of the projector
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Px. As a consequence, the density matrix form of the fixed points also
holds as Px(|xi〉〈xi|) = (Px|xi〉)〈xi| = |xi〉〈xi|. This establishes that Px
will retrieve the density matrix form of the relevant senses expressed in
equation 1.9.
Bn×m is an n×m matrix with columns
[|x1〉|x2〉 · · · |xr〉||y1〉|y2〉 · · · |ym−r〉] = [Xn×r|Yn×(m−r)]
The projection operator Px retrieves those fixed points relevant to the con-
text. All other senses are projected onto the zero vector |0〉:
PxB = Px[X |Y ]
= [PxX |PxY ]
= [X |0]
For the case m = n, the matrix B has an inverse B−1 so the makeup of the
required projection operator is given by:







With an eye on operational deployment on a large scale, a simple algorithmic
construction of Px is based on the intuition that those senses which are not
orthogonal to the cue should be retrieved from the linear combination of m
senses (equation 1.9):
Bx = {|ei〉|〈x|ρi|x〉 > 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ m}
(Recall that ρi = |ei〉〈ei|). In terms of the running example, Bx = {|ec〉, |eh〉,
the two senses relevant to “Reagan” seen in the context of “Iran”.






where cos θi is the angle between |x〉 and |ei〉. In the second last line the
equivalence between Euclidean scalar product and cosine was employed due
to the vectors being normalized to unit length. This value reflects how much
the given sense is being activated to the level ai by the cue |x〉. Stated
otherwise, ai reflects the strength with which the sense ρi is aligned with
the cue |x〉. All senses |ei〉 in the basis Bx will have a positive activation
value ai. By appropriately scaling the values ai, the effect of projector Px
can now be expressed as a probability mixture:
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(1.14) Pxρw = p1ρ1 + . . .+ prρr
where ρi = |ei〉〈ei|, for all |ei〉 ∈ Bx and p1 + . . . + pr = 1. The import of
the last equation is that the effect of the projector Px results in a density
matrix.
4.3 The probability of collapse
It is illustrative to examine how in the light of the running example the
scalar value resulting from the matching process determines the probability
of collapse (equation 1.12). First, the effect of the cue “Iran” via the context
vector |i〉 is shown. The “memory” to be probed derives from the target
“Reagan” and is denoted by the density matrix ρr.
〈i|ρr = 〈i|(p1ρ1 + . . .+ pmρm)
= p1〈i|ρ1 + . . .+ pm〈i|ρm
Recall that each of the m constituent density matrices ρi derives from a
particular sense of “Reagan” denoted ei. Therefore the previous equation
can be written as,
〈i|ρr = p1〈i|(|e1〉〈e1|) + . . .+ pm〈i|(|em〉〈em|)
= p1(〈i|e1〉)〈e1|+ . . .+ pm(〈i|em〉)〈em|
= p1 cos θ1〈e1|+ . . .+ pm cos θm〈em|
The salient facet of the last line is those senses that are not orthogonal to
the context vectors will be retrieved (cos θi > 0)and will contribute to the
probability of collapse. This accords with the intuitions expressed in the
previous section. In the running example, these senses were denoted |ec〉
and |eh〉. So,
〈i|ρr = pc cos θc〈ec|+ ph cos θh〈eh|
A second aspect of the matching is post multiplying with the target vector
“Reagan”, denoted |r〉:
(pc cos θc〈ec|+ ph cos θh〈eh|)|r〉 = pc cos θc(〈ec|r〉) + ph cos θh(〈eh|r〉)
= pc cos θc cosψc + ph cos θh cosψh
= pcmc + phmh
The angles cosψ reflects how strongly the the sense correlates with the
given target. It can be envisaged as a measure of significance of the given
sense with the target |r〉. The scores due to matching of the probe with
memory are reflected by the scalars mc and mh. These are modified by
associated probabilities of the respective senses. Finally, the two terms are
added to return a single scalar. The probability of collapse is assumed to
be a function of this value.
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4.4 Summary
The preceding development has centred around providing an account of the
collapse of meaning in the light of context. It is important that the formal-
ization rests on non-orthogonal density matrices, which is in contrast to the
orthogonal approach used in the SCOP model [Aerts and Gabora, 2005].
The approach presented here draws inspiration from a cue which probe hu-
man memory and describes collapse of meaning in terms of memory cues.
The notion of a “probe” is not foreign to QM. The most useful probes of
the various wave functions of atoms and molecules are the various forms
of spectroscopy. In spectroscopy , an atom or molecule starting with some
wave function (represented by a density matrix) is probed with light, or
some other particle. The light interacts with the molecule and leaves it in
another state. This process is analogous to the probing of memory just de-
scribed. Chemical physics also shares another similarity with our account
in the sense that the underlying density matrices cannot be assumed to be
orthogonal. Nonorthogonal density matrix perturbation theory has arisen
to deal with nonorthogonal density matrices and may turn out to be a rel-
evant area for formalizing additional aspects of a logic of “down below”.
The analogy should be mindfully employed, however. Human memory is
a vast topic abundant with texture and nuance, not to mention strident
debate. However we feel investigations into the memory literature can bear
further fruit in relation to a QM inspired account of a logic of “down be-
low”. The matrix model of memory described above has been extended
to provide an account of analogical mapping [Wiles et al., 1994]. In our
opinion, it is reasonable to assume that analogical reasoning has roots in
subsymbolic logic. Dunbar [Dunbar, 1999] concludes from cognitive studies
that scientists frequently resort to analogies when there is not a straight-
forward answer to their current problem. Therefore, analogical reasoning
sometimes plays a crucial role in hypothesis formation which is fundamental
to abduction[Gabbay and Woods, 2005, Chapter 7]. Reasoning, then, be-
comes highly confounded with memory processes. Consider the “Tweety”
example described earlier. When one learns that “Tweety is a penguin”, it
is debatable whether any reasoning takes place at all. We would argue that
the example can be explained in terms of probes to memory and the asso-
ciated dynamics of defaults emerge out of context effects. We have argued
such probes bear a striking similarity to quantum collapse.
5 Quantum Logic and Conceptual Generalization
A proposal for reasoning at the subsymbolic level must give an account for
how conceptual structures may arise from perceptual observations. For ex-
ample, in Word and Object, Quine [Quine, 1960, p. 25] famously challenged
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philosophers to give an account for how a hearer might reliably deduce that a
speaker who utters the word “gavagai” upon seeing a rabbit actually means
“rabbit”, instead of “part of a rabbit”, or a member of some other class
such as “rabbit or guppy”, or even “rabbit or Reagan”. In other words,
how might a conceptual logic give rise to a recognition and representation
of natural kinds, in such a way that this logic is cognitively beneficial?
It is known that some logics are more amenable to inductive learning than
others, and that direct adherence to the Boolean distributive law effectively
prevents the sort of smoothing or closure operations that may lead to the
formation of natural kinds (see[Widdows and Higgins, 2004]). For example,
since Boolean logic is modelled on set theory and the union of the set of
rabbits and the set of frogs is a perfectly well-formed set, the concept “rab-
bit or guppy” is as natural as the concept of “rabbit” in Boolean logic. At
the other extreme, a single-inheritance taxonomic logic (based, for example,
on phylogenetic inheritance) may overgeneralize by assuming that the dis-
junction of “rabbit” and “guppy” must be the lowest common phylogenetic
ancestor “vertebrate”. This would lead also to unfortunate consequences,
such as the presumption that, since a rabbit makes a good pet for a child
and a guppy makes a good pet for a child, any vertebrate makes a good pet
for a child.
Compared with the discrete extreme of Boolean classification, and the
opposite extreme of a single-inheritance taxonomy, the vector lattice of
quantum logic presents and attractive middle ground. There are distinctly
well-formed concepts represented by lines and planes, there is a natural clo-
sure or smoothing operator defined by the linear span of a set, and there
is a scope for multiple inheritance (since a line is contained is many dif-
ferent planes and an m-dimensional subspace is contained in many m+ n-
dimensional subspaces). Some practical evidence for the usefulness of the
linear span as a disjunction of two concept vectors was provided by the ex-
periments in [Widdows, 2003], in which the removal of a pair of concepts us-
ing negated quantum disjunction proved greatly more effective than Boolean
negation at the task of removing unwanted keywords and their synonyms.
The argument that projection onto subspaces of a vector space can be used
as a solution to the age-old problem of learning from incomplete experi-
ence has been made one of the mainstays of Latent Semantic Analysis, by
[Landauer and Dumais, 1997] and others.
It should also be noted that the use of a pure quantum logic for concept
generalization in semantic space leads to problems of its own, as one would
expect with any attempt to apply such a simple mathematical model to a
wholesale description of language. In particular, quantum disjunctions may
often overgenerate, because of the nature of the linear independence and
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the operation of taking the linear span. In practice, vectors that are very
close to one another in semantic space may still be linearly independent,
and will thus generate a large subspace that does not reflect that fact that
the vectors were in fact drawn from a small region of this subspace. This
danger is illustrated in Figure 1.2, which depicts two groups of three vectors
in a 3-dimensional vector space. In the left hand picture, the vectors A, B
and C are orthogonal and can be used to generate the whole of the space.
The vectors D, E and F , far from being orthogonal, have high mutual
similarity. However, since these vectors are still linearly independent, they
can still be used to generate the whole of the space. In other words, the
quantum disjunctions A∨B∨C andD∨E∨F are identical. This seems quite
contrary to intuition, which would suggest that the conceptD∨E∨F should
be much more specific than the concept A∨B ∨C. A practical drawback of
this overgeneration is that a search engine that used quantum disjunction
too liberally would be likely to generate results that would only be judged
relevant by users willing for their queries to be extrapolated considerably.
There is a natural way to fix this problem in the formalism, and it bears
an interesting relation to the observation that non-orthogonal vectors and
subspaces give rise to subtly related non-commuting density matrices. In
the diagram, the vector E lies nearly but not quite upon the line from
D to F . To simplify the description of the local situation, a reasonable
approximation would be to represent E by its projection onto the subspace
D ∨ F . This would amount to making the assertion “E is between D and
F”, which might not be exact, but from a human standpoint is certainly
true. To generalize from this example, it would be reasonable to say that
a vector B can be approximately derived from a set A1, . . . , Aj if distance
between B and the projection of B onto A1 ∨ . . . ∨ Aj is small. Defining
‘small’ in practice is a subtle challenge, and to some extent is in the eye of
the beholder — to some, Liszt is adequately represented as being somewhere
between Beethoven and Brahms, but to some, his music has special qualities
independently of both.
Such a discussion suggest that one of the requirements for a working quan-
tum logic of semantic space is the ability to model automatically the “natu-
ral dimension” of a sample of points. This problem will have many variants,
and different solutions will be appropriate for different users. However, there
are some general techniques such as the Isomap algorithm [Tenenbaum et al., 2000]
that provide dimensional decompositions of this sort, even for samples of
points taken from nonlinear submanifolds of vector spaces. From a cogni-
tive point of view, such a dimensional simplification is to be expected and
indeed preferred. From microscopic observation and subsequent progress in









Figure 1.2. Orthogonal vectors in 3-space compared with 3 similar vectors.
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complex 3-dimensional structure, which may have a detailed fractal surface
and according to some physical theories may consist of particles that need
several more dimensions to be represented correctly. However, even to those
humans who are well versed in such scientific precision, the tabletop is for
all practical purposes a 2-dimensional structure, and you can certainly de-
scribe the whereabouts of any perceptual object on the table at a relevant
scale of reference by giving two coordianates.
The challenges for adapting the vector space model to describing seman-
tics and perception do not end here, of course. Many of the vector space
axioms (such as the underlying assumption that vectors form a commuta-
tive group under addition) are seriously off the mark when viewed from a
cognitive perspective. The purpose of this discussion is not to convince the
reader that these problems have been completely solved, but that the im-
mediate drawbacks of a naive implementation of quantum logic and concept
formation in semantic space can be anticipated by a more careful consider-
ation of the cognitive and logical goals of the system, whereupon plausible
solutions can be found using existing mathematics.
6 Summary and Conclusions
A logic that is shaped by the empirical make-up of reasoning agents is sub-
ject to the same experimental challenges and limitations that affect the
investigation of human subjects quite generally. The interior of the atom
is, in well-known ways, difficult to access, but the interior of the reasoning
agent throws up accessibility difficulties of an entirely different order. Ex-
perimental psychology, to take the most obvious example, has had to learn
how to flourish despite the collapse of behaviourism and introspectivism.
A great part of its success, such as it is, is owed to the skill with which it
organizes its theoretical outputs around strongly plausible conjectures. In a
rough and ready way, conjecturing is what one does in the absence of obser-
vation. In this regard, we are reminded of the grand conjecture with which
Planck launched quantum theory itself, an idea whose immediate import
in 1900 was the unification of the laws of black body radiation. In taking
a quantum approach to the logic of reasoning down below, two sources of
conjecture merge. In probing the down below, we conjecture in ways that
incorporate the conjectures of quantum mechanics. Of course, by now there
is ample empirical confirmation of quantum theory, as well as encouraging
empirical support for cognitive psychology in some of its manifestations,
but neither of those desirable outcomes would have been possible without
the founding conjectures around which the original theories organized them-
selves. It is the same way with the logic of down below. A reliable empirical
understanding of it has no chance of occurring spontaneously. It must be
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preceded by theoretical speculation. Eddington once quipped that theories
are “put-up jobs”, anticipating Quine’s crack that theories are “free for the
thinking up”. These, of course, are jokes. The fact is that the practice
of scientific conjecture is respectable to the degree that it conforms to the
canons of abductive logic. One of the marks of an abductively successful
conjecture is its narrative coherence with what is known observationally
about the subject in question. [Thagard, 1989],[Gabbay and Woods, 2005].
Smooth narratives identify possible scenarios. This is how we find ourselves
positioned here. We have sketched what we take to be a coherent narrative
of the quantum character of reasoning down below. To the extent that we
have succeeded in this, we have outlined a possible theory for such reason-
ing. What remains now is to sort out ways in which the theory might be
made responsive to observational test. Initial steps in this direction have
been made in the realm of text-mining and search, a field which benefits
from the comparative ease of empirical measurement and hypothesis test-
ing. Whether the theory provides a truly useful model of cognitive processes
will require different observational methods.
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